Predicting secret keys via branch prediction

Basit Öğe Kaydı
dc.contributor.authorAcıiçmez, Onur
dc.contributor.authorKoç, Çetin Kaya
dc.contributor.authorSeifert, J.-P.
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-21T15:53:26Z
dc.date.available2020-11-21T15:53:26Z
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.departmentİstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesien_US
dc.descriptionCryptographers Track at the RSA Conference, CT-RSA 2007 -- 5 February 2007 through 9 February 2007 -- -- 194419en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper announces a new software side-channel attack — enabled by the branch prediction capability common to all modern high-performance CPUs. The penalty paid (extra clock cycles) for a mispredicted branch can be used for cryptanalysis of cryptographic primitives that employ a data-dependent program flow. Analogous to the recently described cache-based side-channel attacks our attacks also allow an unprivileged process to attack other processes running in parallel on the same processor, despite sophisticated partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing or even virtualization. In this paper, we will discuss several such attacks for the example of RSA, and experimentally show their applicability to real systems, such as OpenSSL and Linux. Moreover, we will also demonstrate the strength of the branch prediction side-channel attack by rendering the obvious countermeasure in this context (Montgomery Multiplication with dummy-reduction) as useless. Although the deeper consequences of the latter result make the task of writing an efficient and secure modular exponentiation (or scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve) a challenging task, we will eventually suggest some countermeasures to mitigate branch prediction side-channel attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.en_US
dc.identifier.endpage242en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.issn9.78354E+12
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84944627047en_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3en_US
dc.identifier.startpage225en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11467/3583
dc.identifier.volume4377 LNCSen_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000244559100015en_US
dc.identifier.wosqualityN/Aen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Scienceen_US
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopusen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_US
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)en_US
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectBranch predictionen_US
dc.subjectModular exponentiationen_US
dc.subjectMontgomery multiplicationen_US
dc.subjectRSAen_US
dc.subjectSide channel analysisen_US
dc.subjectSimultaneous multithreadingen_US
dc.titlePredicting secret keys via branch predictionen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US

Dosyalar

Koleksiyon

Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu