Cache based remote timing attack on the AES

Acıiçmez, OnurSchindler, WernerKoç, Çetin Kaya2020-11-212020-11-2120070302-97439.78354E+12https://hdl.handle.net/11467/3581Cryptographers Track at the RSA Conference, CT-RSA 2007 -- 5 February 2007 through 9 February 2007 -- -- 194419We introduce a new robust cache-based timing attack on AES. We present experiments and concrete evidence that our attack can be used to obtain secret keys of remote cryptosystems if the server under attack runs on a multitasking or simultaneous multithreading system with a large enough workload. This is an important difference to recent cache-based timing attacks as these attacks either did not provide any supporting experimental results indicating if they can be applied remotely, or they are not realistically remote attacks. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessAESCache attackRemote attackSide channel analysisTiming analysisCache based remote timing attack on the AESConference Object4377 LNCS271286N/AWOS:000244559100018Q32-s2.0-85022027006