Yilmaz, Ayfer GençAğkaya, Onur2023-11-082023-11-082023https://hdl.handle.net/11467/6952https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004468122_0081 Introduction The distinct separation between the police and the military stems from the emergence of the modern state. According to the traditional view, the legiti- mate monopoly over the use of coercive force by the state relies on the division of labor between the police and the army. Accordingly, the former is occupied with internal law and order whereas the latter defends the state against exter- nal enemies and threats.1 Within this perspective, in Western liberal democra- cies, the deployment of the military within the domestic sphere is conceived as an exception.2 Yet, in each country there are legal and constitutional arrange- ments that determine the exclusive conditions for the deployment of military forces inside state borders, such as the struggle against insurgency or during natural disaster response operations. Moreover, some western democracies have a tradition of institutionalized military participation in domestic security as the case of Italian Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza reflect. Additionally, following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York, some consol- idated democracies did not hesitate to vest more powers within the executive arm of the government and to deploy the military for domestic operations, specifically in the war against terrorism.3eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessMilitary call-out powers and civil-military relations: The case of TurkeyBook Chapter180209N/A2-s2.0-8516216992910.1163/9789004468122_008